# Responses to General Directive 24-1: Required Actions Regarding Assaults on Transit Workers

Jeremy Furrer Division Chief, Office of Transit Safety and Oversight

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### **Purpose and Agenda**

The present recent data trends on assault on transit workers and review information attained from FTA's General Directive 24-1: **Required Actions Regarding Assaults on Transit Workers.** 




**Purpose** 

- Assaults on Transit Workers Data and Trends 1\_
- **Background and High-Level Takeaways from General Directive 24-1** 2.
- **3. Effective Assault Mitigation and Examples**



### Major Transit Worker Assaults: FY 2014–24




• **Source:** National Transit Database (NTD) *FY 2024 data are preliminary.* 

### Major Rail Transit Worker Assaults: FY 2014–24

40 33.89 31.68 30 **Major Rail Transit** 19.14 20.14 **Worker Assault Event** 20 12.94 21.25 9.77 9.70 Rate per 100M VRM 6.68 6.67 10 9.59 0 FY15 FY14 FY16 FY18 FY19 FY17 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 157 **Major Assaults** 51 52 77 78 104 148 70 156 246 266 **Raw Event**, 0 10 0 2 **Fatalities** 0 1 0 0 0 0 Fatality, and  $\mathbf{0}$ **Injury Counts** 162 150 74 165 279 308 Injuries 54 52 79 80 105

• **Source:** National Transit Database (NTD) *FY 2024 data are preliminary.* 

### All Transit Worker Assaults by Severity: April 2023–January 2025



• Source: National Transit Database (NTD)

\*Starred categories are events that do not result in a transit worker fatality or injury.




### Background

# Following FTA issuing a General Directive to address the significant and continuing safety risk associated with assaults on transit workers nationwide, the agency conducted an initial analysis of how transit agencies are responding.

The directive, issued in September 2024, requires more than 700 transit agencies nationwide – those subject to FTA's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans (PTASP) regulation at 49 CFR part 673 – to:

- **Conduct a safety risk assessment** related to assaults on transit workers using the Safety Management System (SMS) processes documented in their Agency Safety Plan (ASP), unless the agency conducted a safety risk assessment related to assaults on transit workers in the twelve months preceding the date of issuance of the General Directive.
- Identify safety risk mitigations or strategies necessary as a result of the safety risk assessment.






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# **Timing of Safety Risk Assessments**

#### **Did the General Directive result in transit agencies** conducting a safety risk assessment?

- Yes.
  - 90% of transit agencies that submitted reports (602 transit agencies) conducted a safety risk assessment as a result of the General Directive.
  - 10% (66 transit agencies) reported that a safety risk assessment on this topic had been completed *in the twelve months prior* to the date of issuance of the General Directive.






### **Rail/Multi-Modal Agencies and the Overall Risk Rating**

#### How are rail/multi-modal transit agencies rating the risk of the potential consequences of assaults on transit workers?

 The General Directive required transit agencies to provide an overall risk rating (likelihood and severity) for the potential consequences of assaults on transit workers. The charts below illustrate the overall distribution of the likelihood and severity risk ratings submitted by rail/multi-modal agencies.



#### Rail/Multi-Modal Overall Risk Rating (Likelihood)




#### **Rail/Multi-Modal Overall Risk Rating (Severity)**



### Mitigations and the Safety Risk Assessment

How many transit agencies and/or their Safety Committees determined mitigations were necessary through the agency's safety risk assessment?

 68% (457 transit agencies and/or Safety Committees) determined that safety risk mitigations were necessary to reduce the hazard's assessed risk.





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#### What mitigations are rail/multi-modal transit agencies deploying?



### **#1 De-Escalation Training**



#### #2 Video/Audio Surveillance



**#3** Operating Policies and Procedures



#4 Signage Informing Riders of Surveillance/Penalties



## Mitigation Effectiveness Evaluation – Rail/Multi-modal Agencies

RTAs told FTA if mitigations had been confirmed effective or ineffective, or if this had not yet been determined.

69% of RTAs confirmed Video/Audio Surveillance to be effective

68% of RTAs confirmed Automatic Vehicle Location to be effective

66% of RTAs confirmed Patrol Strategies to be effective



53% of RTAs confirmed Operator Area Protective Barriers to be effective



### **Video/Audio Surveillance**

RTAs confirmed this mitigation to be effective **69%** of the time and ineffective **3%** of the time (28% not yet determined).

#### **RTAs reported a range of strategies, including:**

- Onboard cameras
- Cameras at facilities and platforms
- Footage regularly reviewed by assault working group to identify patterns and recommend additional strategies

#### **Pros:**

- Prevention: has allowed security personnel to communicate with potentially unruly patrons before de-escalation needed
- Footage has supported prosecution efforts
- Cameras have deterred criminal activity
- Footage supports training efforts

#### Cons:

 Cameras have helped record crimes and support investigations but have not deterred criminal activity



### **Automatic Vehicle Location**

RTAs confirmed this mitigation to be effective **68%** of the time and ineffective **3%** of the time (29% not yet determined).

#### **RTAs reported a range of strategies, including:**

- Computer-Aided Dispatch/AVL
- Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) in Operations Control Center
- GPS trackers
- Train locations can be viewed by smartphone app

#### **Pros:**

- Supervisors and managers have been able to expedite any response for any issues on board the vehicle
- Control always knows vehicle location
- Decreased response times
- Location data used for all incident records to track operational and incident trends

#### **Cons:**

• While response time improved, AVL has not effectively reduced assaults



### **Patrol Strategies**

RTAs confirmed this mitigation to be effective **66%** of the time and ineffective **5%** of the time (29% not yet determined).

#### **RTAs reported a range of strategies, including:**

- Patrol of rail vehicles and facilities by contracted security and local law enforcement
- Patrol deployment based on incident location data
- Dedicated transit police force
- Increased security officers

#### **Pros:**

- Operators have expressed gratitude for transit police presence and deterrence
- Decreasing worker assault rates
- Has helped address other crimes in addition to worker assault

#### **Cons:**

 Additional patrols have not addressed all needs in certain high-risk end-of-line terminals and platforms.



### **Covert/Overt Emergency Alarms**

RTAs confirmed this mitigation to be effective **60%** of the time and ineffective **9%** of the time (31% not yet determined).

#### **RTAs reported a range of strategies, including:**

- Button in operator cab that alerts control center
- Button in operator cab that turns on a blue light on top of the streetcar
- Button changes LRV destination sign to a "Call Police" message alerting the public to a potential need for emergency assistance

#### **Pros:**

- Improved communications
- Can alert others without escalating situations
- Decreased response times

#### **Cons:**

- Alert light on streetcar not easily visible during the day and hard for the public to see
- While response time improved, the button did not effectively deter assaults
- Lack of training on use of button



### Safety Management Systems: Lessons Learned from GD 24-1

### **Safety Risk Management**

- Identify hazards
- Assess risk
- Mitigate risk

"what's wrong?" "how bad is it?" "how will we fix it?"

### **Safety Assurance**

- Monitor mitigations
- Measure performance

"are our fixes working?" "are we meeting our safety objectives?"

#### **Lessons Learned from GD 24-1**

# Agencies were able to leverage their **Safety Risk Management** processes

• Only 10% of agencies had conducted safety risk assessments on the topic in 12 months prior to GD 24-1


# **Safety Assurance** processes proved more challenging for the industry

• While agencies were generally able to assess safety risk, monitoring the effectiveness of mitigations proved more difficult



### **General Directive Resources**

On January 16, 2025, FTA published *Responses to General Directive 24-1: Required Actions Regarding Assaults on Transit Workers*.





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### **Thank you!**

Jeremy Furrer

jeremy.furrer@dot.gov

