U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration

2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

October 19-20, 2021

2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans

Maria Wright

Senior Program Manager, Program Management Division Office of Transit Safety and Oversight Federal Transit Administration




Overview

- Authority
- Minimum Requirements
- Scope & Responsibilities
- External Coordination
- Be Prepared!

Authority - Oversight

49 C.F.R. § 674.25(b)

An SSOA must review and approve the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) for every rail fixed guideway public transportation system within its oversight. An SSOA must oversee an RTAs execution of its PTASP. An SSOA must enforce the execution of a PTASP, through an order of a corrective action plan or any other means, as necessary or appropriate. An SSOA must ensure that a PTASP meets the requirements (49 C.F.R. § 673).



Authority – Minimum Requirements

49 C.F.R. § 673.11(a)(6)

A rail transit agency must include or incorporate by reference in its PTASP an emergency preparedness and response plan or procedures that addresses, at a minimum:

- The assignment of employee responsibilities during an emergency; and
- Coordination with Federal, State, regional, and local officials with roles and responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response in the transit agency's service area.



Scope & Responsibilities

- Define Scope of the Emergency Plan
- Develop a Plan that Covers Facilities, Resources, and Other Property
- Identify Key Employees
- Identify Key Departments/Office
- Establish Responsibilities for Employees



External Coordination



- Local
- State
- Federal
- Law Enforcement
- Fire & Hazardous Material Agencies
- Medical
- Shared Facilities
- Facilities & Properties Adjacent to RTA Facilities and Systems

Be Prepared!



As a preventative measure empty Metro buses are lined up in the center lanes of an Interstate in case their bus shelters flood. Source: Houston Chronicle; August 26, 2017

Contact Information

Maria Wright Senior Program Manager, Program Management Division Office of Transit Safety and Oversight <u>maria1.wright@dot.gov</u> 202-366-5922

Emergency Response Planning Lessons Learned Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART)

Jill Shaw Emergency Preparedness Manager



Emergency Response Planning

- Strengths
 - Regional Coordination
 - \circ Exercises
 - \circ Regional Working Groups
 - $\circ~$ Familiarization Training
 - After Action Reviews/Lessons Learned
 - AARs From Exercise and Real-World Events





Planning Considerations



- Revenue service is our priority.
- Tell us what you need moved and we will determine how to do it.
- Limited travel radius for evacuations.
- FTA Charter Rule (49 CFR 604)



Real Response Lessons Learned

- Response examples of Hurricanes Katrina & Rita versus Hurricane Harvey
- Hurricane Katrina/Rita 2005
 - First time North Texas set up mega shelters for evacuees.
 - DART requested to provide transportation support and passes.
 - State requested rail evacuation for Galveston.





Real Response Lessons Learned



Hurricane Harvey 2017

- North Texas jurisdictions are **pros** at setting up mega shelters for evacuees.
- DART requested to provide transportation support and passes again.
- Passes had to be paid for before issuing to evacuees.



U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration

2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

October 19-20, 2021

2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans

Christopher Higgins

Chief, Counterterrorism and Security Initiatives Department of Security MTA New York City Transit






https://www.history.com/news/d-day-normandy-wwii-facts

"Plans are good. Planning is everything."

Playbook



Playbook

PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT Develop an "In Case of Emergency, Break Glass" document (pre-security incident) for immediate off-the-shelf availability and easy reference. List the initial "playbook" operational response steps within each of the Security divisions, for three phases, escalating in magnitude and severity. Empower each division chief or highest-ranking manager on duty, along with his/her immediate staff, to initiate the minimally proscribed steps until the arrival of additional resources and wider instructions from the executive staff. Ensure an integrated, safe, and coordinated response by all **terminate** Department of Security Divisions. QUALIFYING NOTES II. Each security incident is dynamic and unique and will require a tailored response given the specific circumstances, Security's actions will also be shaped by information received from law enforcement and its response. Certain operational steps or "actionables" cited in this playbook may not be immediately required or necessarily appropriate. Managerial discretion, evolving incident information and intelligence, along with the availability of resources within the sphere of Security's jurisdiction, must all inform decision making. Incidents that evolve into suspected or confirmed use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), e.g., chemical, biological, or radiological, will trigger the applicable are security WMD Response protocols. Please refer to the "WMD Directives Binder" located within the Operating Theatre library. Consideration must be given to a recovery plan when circumstances indicate a de-escalation of resources and a return to normal operations. FOR INTERNAL SECURITY USE ONLY 01/06/2020 Page 2 of 23

Playbook

PLANS A, B, C III.

PLAN A: PRELIMINARY PHASE

A newly emergent situation that requires the collection of more information, ideally from multiple corroborating sources, chief among them law enforcement. The information is piecemeal, raw, and even contradictory. Notifications, "spooling up" of resources, and other preparatory measures are appropriate in anticipation of a possibly wider reaction/response. However, further evaluation and assessment must continue to inform executive decision making.

PLAN B: ELEVATED PHASE

There is articulable information pointing towards a confirmed security/safety incident. It is an evolving situation, with still unknown variables, but with mounting credible information supporting the theory of intentional/willful/deliberate and purposeful misconduct by identified/unidentified individuals.

PLAN C: SEVERE PHASE

Law enforcement or other officials have confirmed the situation as involving criminality or terrorism. The possibility of additional incidents (attacks) is considered real and possibly imminent.


VARIABLES TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINATION OF "PLAN A, B, C" ACTIVIATION:

- Proximity of event to
- Size/Magnitude of Incident;
- Nexus to public transportation;
- <u>i</u> Specific direction by executive staff, e.g. V.P. Security.

FOR INTERNAL SECURITY USE ONLY 01/06/2020

Page 3 of 23

Memo



2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION


Tabletop Exercise

"ADVANCE MEMO" TO TEEX TTX PARTICIPANTS ("Setting the Stage for Focused Discussion") Dear Colleagues, It has been said that having plans is good, but planning is everything. In this spirit, we have engaged the professional services of the to help guide us in a tabletop exercise (TTX) dealing with a "Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack" (CCTA). We are set to meet on Monday, November 6th, from 9:30 am through 2:00 pm at In order to maximize the benefits from this important exercise, please be prepared to engage in frank, participative discussion and serious debate about your agency's actions in response to evolving information, including the potential for multiple, cascading events around our City and region. The experienced TTX facilitators are set to elevate our discussion from the initial, reflexive, tactical response to the operational and strategic levels that I will need each of you to consider and articulate. At the center of our dialogue will be deciding if, when and where "Code Bravo" will be appropriately activated. The controlled, systematic or partial shutdown of and operational assets, in reaction to a CCTA, must be predicated on very thoughtful processes. Collectively, we need to vigorously explore this weighty issue and its implications. I expect how we address "Code Bravo" to be one of the most valuable "actionables" from this exercise. I am looking forward to working with you that day. Thanks in advance for your participation.

÷.



Tabletop Exercise





2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

November 6, 2017 TABLETOP EXERCISE TAKES PLACE



NYCT - Attempted Terrorist Attack

Monday, December 11, 2017

Attempted Terrorist Attack in NYCT Subway System



2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

NYCT - Attempted Terrorist Attack

2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop






Security Command Center Timeline

ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK INCIDENT TIMELINE

At 0746 hours, The topological and the second s
At 0746 hours, Police Officer () from () from () from () for the second of the sec
0747 Hours
At 0747 hours, Police Stripped male (subject) placed in custody - Removed from the scene by Cases At 0748 hours, Superintendent and at the Cases and Cases and Cases notified via landline
At 0749 hours, superinterioring at the superinteriorin
At 0145 Hours, the second se
0750 Hours - 0758 Hours
At 0750 hours, Chief
At 0757 hours, and a second second second second conter Sgt. and was notified via landline
At 0758 hours, and a second
0800 Hours - 0859 Hours
At 0800 hours, the standard standard Chief the standard standard in the standard standard in the standard sta
At 0807 hours, additional incident video was sent to an additional sector and the sector via landline
At 0830 hours, Incident video was downloaded
At 0847 hours, Mgr. and the informed by and Analyst (and the information of the incident from an unknown source was posted on Twitter. Mgr. and and the incident from an unknown and spoke with PO and and and spoke with PO and
informed him that video of the incident is on social media.
At 0854 hours, Video log #
At 0859 hours, TPPS provide at the provide was directed to make an additional radio announcement to all posts (Approved by AGS
0930 Hours
Det. (Carrowski) from (Carrowski) picked up incident video- Log#
<u>1000 Hours</u>
Det. Contractions from toppartition requested additional Bus video related to subject's private vehicle parked in the vicinity of incident.
incident.
1145 Hours
Det. The reader from the stand picked up incident video- Log# the reader stands to be a stand of the stand of
1330 Hours
At 1330 hours, A Security Alert and was generated
2130 Hours
Enderal Burea Investigations (FBI) Special Agent (Constant Contacted Contacted Constant Const
a copy of video the footage for attempted attack at 42nd Street

2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

Security Alert Issued



ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK IN SUBWAY A REMINDER TO STAY ALERT

IT IS OUR SYSTEM AND OUR CITY: TOGETHER WE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE

As widely reported this morning, Monday, December 11, an individual, now in police custody, detonated a pipe bomb strapped on his torso, while walking among Manhattan commuters in the busy subway corridor located between the Port Authority and Times Square subway lines. Law enforcement has indicated that the device, which may have been accidentally detonated at the time, was unsophisticated and homemade, supporting internet propaganda calling for Do-It-Yourself ("DIV") terrorism methods of attack. In response to this threat, law enforcement is again urging all New Yorkers not to be fearful but to be aware of our daily surroundings and immediately report suspicious persons, unusual encounters, questionable inquiries, or unusual vehicles or packages.

The following is a list of potential indicators that suicide bombers MAY exhibit traveling to, in the vicinity of, or at the point of attack:

 Wearing loose-fitting or bulky clothing inconsistent with weather conditions.

 Exhibiting protruding bulges or exposed wires under clothing, possibly through a sleeve.

Emitting strange chemical odors.

 Displaying excessive sweating, mumbling, fidgeting, or conversely, being unusually calm and detached.

- Attempting to gain a position near crowds or VIPs.
- Tightening hands, a possible sign of holding a detonation
- device.

Wearing a disguise appropriate to target areas to elude detection or gain entry to restricted areas. Disguises may
include agency, military, medic, firefighter, or police uniforms. Women may pose as pregnant. Men may pose as
women.

- Carrying heavy luggage or wearing a backpack.
- · Having a pale face and arms suggestive of recent shaving, or having closely cropped hair.
- Unable to focus eyes—paying little attention to surrounding activities or persons.
- Unresponsive to authoritative voice commands, salutations, or other routine distractions.
- Exhibiting an unnatural gait and posture.

Displaying ambivalent or anxious behavior such as retracing steps or movements, or engaging in seemingly
purposeless actions.

NYCT employees should contact their respective operational Command Centers. The Department of Security Command Center should also be contacted at 718-694-4278 as soon as possible. In an emergency, please call 911 first. When applicable, NYCT employees are reminded to complete a "Security Incident Tracking System" (SITS) Worksheet. More information and guidance about SITS can be found on MTA Today, within the Department of Security homepage.

This Security Alert will NOT be disseminated outside of MTA/NYCT without the express, written permission of the NYCT Department of Security. These Security Alerts are for MTA/NYCT employee awareness and WILL ONLY BE DISPLAYED IN NON-PUBLIC AREAS OF THE MTA/NYCT SYSTEM. This alert, barring exigent circumstances, will expire sixty (60) days after issuance.



2021 FTA Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Virtual Workshop

"THIS IS WHAT WE TRAIN FOR."

Contact Information

Christopher Higgins

Chief, Counterterrorism and Security Initiatives Department of Security MTA New York City Transit <u>Christopher.Higgins@nyct.com</u>