

Transportation Security Administration



# COVID-19 BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED WORKSHOP

SEPTEMBER 15, 2020 | VIRTUAL

### PURPOSE

The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Surface Operations, Policy, Plans, and Engagement, and the Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee (STSAC) Emergency Management and Resilience Subcommittee (EM&R) collaborated to host a virtual COVID-19 Best Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop. The purpose of this workshop was to convene a group of surface transportation security partners to share, discuss, and validate COVID-19 best practices and lessons learned related to transportation operators' pandemic planning, logistics, information sharing, and response.

## STSAC AND EM&R SUBCOMMITTEE OVERVIEW



The STSAC was established in 2019 in accordance with the TSA Modernization Act of 2018 to advise the TSA Administrator on the development and implementation of surface transportation security policies, programs, and regulations. Together, the TSA Administrator and STSAC identified five initial priority issues for the STSAC: improving cybersecurity information sharing, insider threat, measuring security effectiveness in surface transportation, intelligence and information sharing, and information protection. To address these areas, the STSAC created the following four subcommittees: • EM&R

• Cybersecurity Insider Threat Security Risk and Intelligence

The EM&R Subcommitee hosted its first meeting in May 2020 during which members decided to focus on the development of a COVID-19 Pandemic After Action / Lessons Learned Report. The purpose of this report is to assist STSAC members and the surface transportation sector address the COVID-19 pandemic and prepare for future events. This workshop served to validate the group's initial observations and identify gaps. This workshop also supported the committee's ability to produce a lessons learned and best practices document that can be shared with the surface transportation subsector to help support their preparedness and resiliency efforts.

## STAKEHOLDERS

Government: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of Transportation, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Transit Administration, and Transportation Security Administration

Transportation Operators: Amtrak, Bay Area Rapid Transit Police, BNSF Railway, Brightline, Canadian National Railway, Chicago Transit Authority, Delaware River Port Authority Police Department, Devon Energy, Kansas City Southern Railway, King County Metro Transit Department, Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Metro Transit, Metro Transit Police Department, Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New Jersey Transit Police, Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District, Sound Transit, Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, Olin Corporation, Public Service Enterprise Group, and Xcel Energy

Transportation Associations: American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, American Public Transportation Association, Association of American Railroads, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, National Association of Chemical Distributors, National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, and The Chlorine Institute

## WORKSHOP OUTCOMES

The following page provides all best practices, lessons learned, and options for improvement discussed during the COVID-19 Best Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop. Items marked with an asterisk are new additions and/or revisions based on workshop discussion. Some findings were revised for brevity and clarity. Please contact STSAC EM&R Industry Co-Chair Jennifer Gibson and TSA Co-Chair Chris McKav for further details.

## **AFTER ACTION BRIEF**







	BEST PRACTICES	LESSONS LEARNED	<b>OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT</b>
PANDEMIC PLANNING	<ul> <li>Leverage pre-existing influenza/ pandemic plans</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Existing plans were outdated and/or did not fully address worldwide pandemics</li> </ul>	Update pandemic plans from experience
	Maintain relationships and lines of	<ul> <li>The Federal government's initial pandemic response was slow and reactionary</li> <li>Operators infrequently reviewed communications procedures prior to the pandemic*</li> </ul>	Implement pandemic response best practices
	communication with state/local EOCs		<ul> <li>Increase training on pandemic plans</li> <li>Ensure stockpiles of PPE and other materials</li> </ul>
	Apply CDC guidelines		for essential operations*
	<ul> <li>Coordinate with Federal agencies and operators to establish essential workers guidance</li> </ul>		• Continue to use Federal guidelines to identify essential workers
	<ul> <li>Invite labor unions to participate in the pandemic planning and decision-</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Coordinate with state/local health officials so plans align with current guidance*</li> </ul>
	making process*		<ul> <li>Develop/review pandemic communications plans*</li> </ul>
PANDEMIC LOGISTICS	• Establish working groups with transportation partners to procure/	<ul> <li>There was not enough PPE/disinfectant</li> <li>Operators experienced difficulty with PPE</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Ensure emergency stockpiles of PPE and disinfectant</li> </ul>
	distribute supplies <ul> <li>Support rapid activation of state/local</li> </ul>	<ul><li>supply chain integrity</li><li>Operators struggled to coordinate with</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Address surface operators' PPE needs earlier</li> </ul>
	EOCs <ul> <li>Permit emergency authorities for critical</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Operators struggled to coordinate with the Federal government to secure PPE</li> <li>PPE did not meet OSHA standards</li> <li>The pandemic disrupted the supply chain for mission-critical materials*</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Coordinate PPE distribution in a more timely and effective manner</li> </ul>
	goods/services contracts <ul> <li>Adopt and implement CDC</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Adopt face coverings, gloves, and temperature screening earlier</li> </ul>
	recommendations quickly*	• Existing IT systems (e.g., VPNs and	Adopt increased and earlier COVID testing
	<ul> <li>Transition staff who do not need to be on-site to telework</li> </ul>	timekeeping) did not support telework*	• Train staff on remote timekeeping systems*
		<ul> <li>Newly remote employees were unfamiliar with telework procedures*</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Assess and/or increase VPN bandwidth*</li> </ul>
PANDEMIC INFO SHARING	<ul> <li>Communicate regularly with transportation partners across industry</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Operators sometimes overwhelmed by the frequency of communication</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Improve coordination among Federal partners to reduce calls and redundancy</li> </ul>
	and government <ul> <li>Stay up-to-date on CDC information</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Operators received inconsistent messaging from partners</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Determine how to enforce social distancing and mask wearing earlier</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Adopt temporary regulatory relief/ enforcement discretion for operators</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>CDC guidance on mask use wavered</li> <li>Labor unions sporadically received/</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Coordinate a consistent phased approach to reopening, especially with local partners*</li> </ul>
	• Exchange best practices and lessons	shared information	Incorporate procedures for communicating
	<ul><li>Provide transportation partners the</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Inconsistent phased reopening guidance caused disparities in jurisdictions*</li> </ul>	with local health officials into pandemic plans*
	opportunity to participate in Incident Command*	<ul> <li>Operators struggled with privacy issues with local health officials in identifying new cases/contact tracing*</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Consolidate Federal pandemic guidance on one website*</li> </ul>
PANDEMIC RESPONSE	<ul> <li>Adjust operations to achieve social distancing early</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Operators did not have pre-existing pandemic PPE or telework policies</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Adopt standard telework policies</li> <li>Provide more training/guidance on effective</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Grant operators the flexibility to make necessary operational changes</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Operators did not have pandemic- specific training to this scale</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Ensure essential workers are trained in PPE</li></ul>
	Continuously engage with the CDC	•Government(s) had inconsistent and	use/fitting
	<ul> <li>Apply for regulatory/enforcement relief early*</li> </ul>	<ul><li>changing policies</li><li>Government(s) were slow to make</li></ul>	• Enact temperature screening early
	• Encourage leadership to provide timely	decisions, especially in the early	<ul> <li>Prioritize PPE, testing, and vaccinations (when available) for essential workers</li> </ul>
	decision-making to address risks to essential staff*	<ul> <li>pandemic stages</li> <li>Operators did not immediately ensure essential staff access to mental health</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Ensure telework capabilities and capacity can handle influx and continuation of</li> </ul>
	Use predictive modeling to forecast     future pandomic impacts to industry*	resources*	remote staff*

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future pandemic impacts to industry\*